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Motivation Cases and W.S. Kirkpatrick
& Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., International
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., International,' there were
two formulations of the act of state doctrine. One, the traditional
formulation as enunciated by the Supreme Court and adhered to
by several circuits, stated that domestic courts may not sit in
judgment of the validity of a foreign state's actions taken within
its own borders.2 The other, developed in the Second and Ninth
Circuits, 3 stated that the act of state doctrine precludes United
States courts from inquiring into not only the validity of, but also
the motivations behind, a foreign sovereign's conduct.4
The conflict in the circuits regarding the proper scope of the
act of state doctrine existed for almost twenty years,5 before being
resolved in 1990 by the Supreme Court. Kirkpatrick reaffirmed the
traditional formulation6 and thereby significantly restricted the doc-
trine's potential to interfere with the functioning of the judicial
process. This Note explores the propriety of the Court's decision
I U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (adopting language
from Hatch v. Baez, 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596 (App. Div. 1876)).
The source of this expanded version of the act of state doctrine is important. The
Ninth and Second Circuits contain the major United States financial and international
business centers. Presumably, courts from those circuits would have a profound effect on
the development of this area of the law in other circuits and perhaps even in the Supreme
Court. As it turned out, however, once the issue reached the Supreme Court in W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l., -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct.
701 (1990) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick II1], it was the Fifth and Third Circuit view that
prevailed.
4 See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404
(9th Cir. 1983); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977); Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
The conflict started in 1971 with the district court's decision in Buttes Gas. How-
ever, the groundwork for controversy was laid much earlier, in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
6 See Kirkpatrick III, - U.S. at -, I10 S. Ct. at 707.
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and its likely impact on a variety of concerns, including separation
of powers, 7 international business transactions,' the enforcement
of domestic laws, 9 and the development of international law.'0
Part I of this Note focuses on the history and purposes of the
act of state doctrine as illuminated by Supreme Court precedent."
Part II introduces the genesis of the controversy regarding the
validity/motivation distinction and examines opinions from the
various circuits adopting the two formulations.1 2 Part III discusses
Kirkpatrick and its ramifications for a number of issues.' 3 The
Note concludes that Kirkpatrick is a sound decision that will change
act of state jurisprudence in some rather significant ways.14
I. THE DOcTRINE's HISTORY AND PURPOSES
A. Act of State Defined
In its predominant form, the act of state doctrine precludes the
courts of one country from inquiring into the validity or legality
of a foreign sovereign's actions within that sovereign's borders. 5
Underhill v. Hernandez,16 the first Supreme Court case to discuss
the doctrine in-depth, stated:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves. 7
As the above language indicates, the doctrine favors resolution of
disputes stemming from actions outside the United States at the
public international law level. Accordingly, actions of foreign soy-
7 See infra notes 174-94 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 205-24 and accompanying text.
,0 See infra notes 225-32 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 15-73 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 74-132 and accompanying text.
," See infra notes 133-232 and accompanying text.
14 See infra note 233-end and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); RE-
STATEMENT (TmIRD) oF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 469 (1986).
16 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
' Id. at 252.
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ereigns and their agents acting within the scope of their authority
should not be examined in domestic courts. 18
The possible scope of the doctrine is expansive. 19 Unlike sov-
ereign immunity, 20 which may be invoked only by a nation or its
agents acting within the scope of their duties, the act of state
doctrine may be employed by private litigants that are not members
of, or related to, any government. 21 The doctrine is often applied
to prevent adjudication in cases between two private parties within
the United States. 22 Foreign governments may also use the doctrine
in United States courts when they lack protection under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.23 The doctrine has been applied in al-
most every type of factual dispute imaginable. At least prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., International,24 courts even invoked the
doctrine in cases where foreign sovereign actions were at the pe-
riphery of the issues in the case. 2 Although most of the Supreme
,8 E.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir.
1979).
" See Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 344
(1986).
20 As a doctrine of international law, sovereign immunity traditionally required the
courts of one sovereign to relinquish jurisdiction over a case in which another sovereign
was named as a defendant. See Deletelier v. Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 670 (D.D.C. 1980)
(citing The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)). The United
States now adheres to the restrictive view of sovereign immunity.
11 See Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983);
Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
2 See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d 1287.
2 See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Note,
Callejo v. Bancomer S.A.: The Need for a Commercial Activity Exception to the Act of
State Doctrine, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 413 (1985) (arguing for a commercial exception
to the act of state doctrine to preview evisceration of the FSIA (28 U.S.C. §§ I note, 1330,
1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-11 (1988)).
- __ U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick 111].
2 See Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.
1983) (Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of an action on the basis
of the act of state doctrine where Plaintiff brought an antitrust action charging Defendant
with making secret payments to official of Umm Al Qaywayn in order to obtain unlawfully
an offshore oil concession.); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977) (Court
of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal of an action on the basis of the act of
state doctrine when Plaintiff, a Libyan oil producer, brought action against other oil
producers to recover for an alleged violation of antitrust laws and for breach of contract.);
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g
331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (The District Court
held that the act of state doctrine required dismissal of an antitrust suit alleging that
defendants, who had an oil concession from Trucial State Sharjah covering their territorial
and offshore waters, conspired with Sharjah, adjacent Trucial State Umm al Qaywayn,
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Court cases applied the act of state doctrine to foreign expropria-
tions, the lower federal courts and state courts have implemented
the doctrine in cases involving bribery of foreign officials, 26 wrong-
ful expulsion and transportation from a country, 27 breach of con-
tract,2 violation of federal securities laws, 29 conspiracies to preserve
competitive advantage and other violations of antitrust laws,30 is-
suance of patents,3 RICO claims against foreign leaders, 32 issuance
of timber licenses,33 granting of oil concessions, 34 and defamation
of foreign presidents. 35 The act of state doctrine even arose in a
case where the plaintiff challenged lobbying efforts of a competitor
in a foreign country.36 It is the obvious potential for near limitless
application that causes many to criticize the doctrine, 37 but a dis-
cussion of such criticism will have to wait until after an examina-
tion of the early Supreme Court cases and the purposes underlying
them.
The combination of precedent and myriad purposes behind the
act of state doctrine created the threat of overapplication in the
first place. In large part, the threat came to pass.
B. The Supreme Court Precedents and the Purposes Behind the
Doctrine
According to one source, the act of state doctrine dates from
seventeenth century England, where it had a close kinship to sov-
ereign immunity.38 Originally, sovereign immunity protected only
Great Brittain, and Iran to deprive plaintiffs of the richest area of plaintiff's offshore oil
concession from Umm al Qaywayn.).
26 See Kirkpatrick III, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 701; Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,
915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990); Clayco Petroleum, 712 F.2d 404; Buttes Gas, 461 F.2d 1261.
27 See Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980); Galu
v. SwissAir: Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 734 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
See Northrop, 705 F.2d 1030; Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex,
686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1982); Arango, 621 F.2d 1371; Hunt, 550 F.2d 68; Phoenix Canada
Oil Co. v. Texaco, 749 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
2 See West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987); Braka v.
Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
3' See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d 1287.
32 See Republic of Phillipines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988).
33 See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979).
34 See Clayco Petroleum, 712 F.2d 404.
31 See DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
36 See O.N.E. Shipping v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, 830 F.2d 449 (2d Cir.
1987).
37 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 344; Note, supra note 23, at 413.
11 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 330.
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the sovereign, leaving state officials subject to liability.39 The act
of state doctrine was created as an addition to sovereign immunity
to fill the gaps. 40
Although first recognized in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fad-
don,41 the doctrine was not invoked by the Supreme Court until
eighty years later, in Underhill v. Hernandez.42 The plaintiff in
Underhill sued the defendant, a Venezuelan general, for damages
occurring immediately following a government takeover. In dis-
missing the case, the Supreme Court enunciated the previously
quoted language,43 thus creating the traditional formulation of the
doctrine.
Over the following twenty years, the Court decided three cases,
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,44 Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co.,4- and Ricaud v. American Metal Co. ,46 that expanded
the act of state doctrine beyond its gap-filling role in Underhill.47
All three cases involved seizures by foreign governments that led
to claims over ownership. In these cases, the Court invoked the
act of state doctrine to preclude domestic adjudication because the
validity of a foreign sovereign's conduct within its own borders
would have been challenged. Such an inquiry, the Court held,
would damage territorial principles of choice of law and cause
international disputes.48
The next series of act of state cases developed during the 1960s
and 1970s as a result of the Cuban Revolution. The first modern
act of state case, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,49 involved
ownership of the proceeds from a sale of sugar that was nation-
alized by the Cuban government. Invoking the wide-ranging lan-
guage from Underhill, the Supreme Court held that the act of state
doctrine precluded the judicial branch from examining whether the
seizure was retaliatory, discriminatory, and confiscatory under in-
ternational law.50 The Court arrived at its holding by balancing the
relevant considerations, including whether the international legal
11 Id. at 331.
0 Id.
4 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
42 168 U.S. 250.
,3 See id. at 252; supra text accompanying note 17.
- 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
45 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
- 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
41 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 332-33.
4 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918).
-9 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
10 Id. at 439.
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principles involved were ill-defined and whether judicial resolution
of the case would embarrass the executive branch in the conduct
of foreign relations.-' The latter factor in the balancing test intro-
duced a new source or rationale for the act of state doctrine,
separation of powers. Sabbatino created the flexible approach or
balancing test that continues to dominate act of state analysis.
Following Sabbatino, the Supreme Court, in 1972, decided First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,52 a case involving
Cuban expropriation of the defendant's branch banks. After the
expropriation, First National City Bank ("Citibank") sold collat-
eral belonging to Banco Nacional de Cuba. The Cuban bank
brought suit and Citibank counterclaimed. 53 The Court held that
the act of state doctrine did not apply.
The confusing opinions rested on several grounds. Three jus-
tices focused on a Bernstein letter5 4 from the State Department
indicating that the act of state doctrine should not apply to the
case because judicial inquiry would not harm separation of pow-
ers.55 One justice held that the act of state doctrine did not apply
because the Cuban bank brought the claim in the first place.
Therefore, Citibank should in fairness and equity have .been al-
lowed to pursue its counterclaim. 56 A fifth justice rejected the
rationale of the others but nevertheless held that the act of state
doctrine did not apply because he saw no potential for separation
of powers concerns. 57 Thus, this fractured decision, based on three
rationales, by five different justices, many of whom explicitly
, Id. at 427-32.
'2 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
'3 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 760-61 (1972).
5 A Bernstein letter is an opinion from the State Department advising the court
whether the act of state doctrine should apply in a given case. Such letters are usually based
on the State Department's analysis of the foreign policy implications of allowing a suit to
continue. Although a majority of the Supreme Court has never adopted, and has indeed
rejected, the Bernstein letter as an exception to the act of state doctrine, many lower courts,
fearing adverse consequences, apply the act of state doctrine absent executive branch
permission to proceed. Case Comment, International Commercial Bribery and the Act of
State Doctrine, 67 WAsH. U.L.Q. 601, 602 n.l1 (1989) [hereinafter Case Comment, Inter-
national Commercial Bribery]; see also Comment, Rationalizing the Federal Act of State
Doctrine and Evolving Judicial Exceptions, 46 FoRDsm L. REv. 295, 299-300 (1977)
[hereinafter Comment, Rationalizing the Federal Act of State Doctrine].
11 Citibank, 406 U.S. at 768-70 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White,
J.).
16 Id. at 772 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result). This opinion initiated yet another
exception to the act of state doctrine, the so called counterclaim exception.
51 Id. at 774-75 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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rejected the reasoning of the others, added little more than con-
fusion to act of state jurisprudence. Perhaps the only theme that
ran through all the opinions, including the dissent5 8 was that an
act of state inquiry must focus on separation of powers concerns.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba59 com-
pleted the Supreme Court's analysis of the doctrine prior to its
most recent decision. In Dunhill, the Cuban plaintiffs sued for
trademark infringement and the value of cigars expropriated by
the Cuban government and sold to the defendant.60 The Court held
that the doctrine did not apply. A majority rejected the existence
of a commercial exception, 61 however, and the holding rested on
the narrow ground that the defendants failed to prove that their
actions were public acts of state.62
An examination of the Supreme Court cases discloses at least
four rationales or purposes for the act of state doctrine. Originally
conceived as a gap-filling addition to sovereign immunity, the act
of state doctrine also is based on the preservation of territorial
principles of choice of law, the avoidance of international con-
frontations, and most recently, the sanctity of separation of pow-
ers .
63
The separation of powers rationale merits the most attention
because it is the driving force behind recent Supreme Court juris-
prudence, 64 and it is the source of the lower courts' expansion of
the doctrine to cover motivation cases. 65 Separation of powers
prevents the coequal branches of the federal government from
interfering with the constitutional duties of every other branch.
11 Id. at 790-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
60 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Repulic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 685-86 (1976).
61 Id. at 706. Four justices in Dunhill asserted yet another exception to the act of
state doctrine, though a majority of the Court did not accept its existence. The exception
would prevent application of the act of state doctrine when the government's activities are
not sovereign in nature. See generally Blau and Friedman, Formulating a Commercial
Exception to the Act of State Doctrine: Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba, 50 ST. JoHN's L. RE. 666 (1976) (analyzing the Dunhill decision and approving the
creation of the exception); Note, supra note 23 (arguing that a commercial exception is
needed to protect the integrity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act); Comment, Ration-
alizing the Federal Act of State Doctrine, supra note 54 (discussing the four principal
exceptions to the act of state doctrine).
Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694 (noting that interventors did not prove theirs was a "public
act of those with authority to exercise sovereign powers.").
63 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 334.
64 See Kirkpatrick III, - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 704.
65 See Buttes Gas, 331 F. Supp. at 110.
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The constitution delegates the responsibility for conducting foreign
relations, in large measure, to the executive branch.6 The judicial
branch, by contrast, is given no foreign affairs power besides the
inherent power to decide cases and controversies.67
The lower courts, giving weight to the disparity in powers
delegated to the various branches of governments, began to employ
several approaches to act of state issues. They deferred to the
executive branch when it spoke on the matter, sometimes even
applying the doctrine to situations where the State Department said
it should not apply. t Where the executive branch was silent, the
courts engaged in a completely independent analysis of whether
separation of powers purposes would be harmed.6 9
There are many facets to the separation of powers inquiry
under the act of state doctrine. 70 Most importantly, courts focus
on whether a judicial determination of the case would prevent the
executive branch from effectively conducting foreign relations. This
includes the possibility of embarrassing the executive branch.7'
Embarrassment of the president or of a foreign sovereign could
create international tensions and harm diplomatic efforts on mat-
ters completely separate from the legal inquiry. As in the political
question doctrine, embarrassment stems from multifarious and con-
tradictory pronouncements or stances taken by two branches of
government. For example, if the president is trying to cultivate
better diplomatic relations with a foreign country, it would do little
good for the judicial branch to declare an action taken by that
foreign country, within its own borders, invalid or unlawful. Such
conflicting positions by the branches of government are difficult
for a foreign state to reconcile. Believing they are incompetent to
explore the foreign policy consequences of their decisions, lower
courts are anxious to apply the act of state doctrine. 72
See U.S. CONST. art. I. The executive branch shares power over foreign affairs with
the legislative branch.
67 The only power related to foreign affairs expressly given to the judiciary is the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over cases involving ambassadors. See U.S. CONsT.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
11 See Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp.
1381, 1397 (D.N.J. 1987) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick 1], rev'd, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988),
aff'd, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
61 See, e.g., Clayco, 712 F.2d at 409 (making no mention of executive branch advice
on the act of state issue, but nevertheless applying the doctrine).
70 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432 (stating that the act of state doctrine has "consti-
tutional underpinnings in the separation of powers doctrine").
71 Id.
72 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 328.
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Against this backdrop of confusing and conflicting precedents,
it is not surprising that lower courts have used the broad language
and wide-ranging purposes announced in Underhill and Sabbatino
as a blank check with which to apply the act of state doctrine.
Justifiably, few courts relish the opportunity to deal with compli-
cated international issues, especially where the foreign relations of
the United States may be harmed.73
One area of doctrinal expansion was completely unwarranted,
however. In the early 1970s lower courts began to apply the act of
state doctrine to cases in which the validity of a foreign sovereign's
conduct was not challenged. These courts concluded that the sep-
aration of powers concerns underlying the doctrine are so powerful
that merely examining the motivations of foreign state's actions is
inappropriate. Their conclusion was wrong, as the Supreme Court's
decision in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp., International points out. An inquiry of why this conclusion
is so is postponed until later. For now, an analysis of the role of
motivation in lower court cases must be examined in order to
understand what Kirkpatrick says and does not say.
II. THE ROLE OF MOTIVATION
A. The Supreme Court's View of Examining Motivation Prior
to W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,
International
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.7 4 began the contro-
versy over whether the act of state doctrine precludes United States
courts from examining the motivations or factual circumstances
surrounding a foreign sovereign's actions. The case dealt with the
plaintiff's allegations under the antitrust laws that the defendant
conspired with a foreign government to ruin its banana plantations.
The Costa Rican government, acting in its sovereign capacity, had
seized the plaintiff's foreign lands.75
Like plaintiffs in later cases, the plaintiff in American Banana
did not challenge the validity or legality of the foreign sovereign's
7 See id.; see also Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative,
23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 104 (1982) (discussing proposed legislation to destroy the doctrine).
- 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
71 Id. at 354-55.
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actions.76 Rather, it sought to prove the conspiracy element of its
antitrust claim by inquiry into the motivations behind Costa Rican
governmental actions. Had the Supreme Court decided the case,
the legality of the expropriation would not have been questioned
and the seizure would not have been undone.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, refused
to question the foreign state's actions. The opinion is based on
several grounds. First, and most importantly, the court held that
antitrust laws did not reach the defendant's actions taken in a
foreign state; these laws had no extraterritorial application.7 7 Sec--
ond, the Court argued, "[A] seizure by a state is not a thing that
can be complained of elsewhere in the courts. ' 78 This statement
had the potential for broad impact on not only the antitrust laws
but also the act of state doctrine in general, because in the factual
setting of American Banana, the plaintiff did not challenge the
validity of a foreign government's actions. Instead, it challenged
the sovereign's motives. The Court's holding, combined with
Holmes' dictum, suggested that such an inquiry was forbidden.
Although the holding-that the antitrust laws had no extrater-
ritorial effect-was substantially overruled by later cases, 79 Holmes'
dictum took on a life of its own in several lower court opinions. 0
Courts examining claims in which only a foreign government's
motivations were challenged often held that they were precluded
from making any inquiry that might impugn the dignity of the
sovereign's actions. 81 Some courts, even when refusing to dismiss
on act of state grounds, cited the American Banana rationale as
76 By doing this, the plaintiff, in a sense, started a trend that will last even through
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Int'l, - U.S. -, 110 S.
Ct. 701 (1990) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick II1]. For years, plaintiffs have sought to avoid
application of the act of state doctrine by arguing that they were not challenging the validity
of a foreign state's conduct. See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Plaintiff tried to characterize foreign government as a victim to show that a validity inquiry
would not be necessary). Of course, after Kirkpatrick, plaintiffs will continue this argument
because absent a challenge to validity, courts may not apply the act of state doctrine.
Kirkpatrick III, - U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 707.
" American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357.
71 Id. at 357-58.
76 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
10 See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404
(9th Cir. 1983); Hunt, 550 F.2d at 68; Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil
Co., 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972).
,, Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407 (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T.
& S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976)).
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presenting a valid factor to be considered in the Sabbatino balanc-
ing test. 82
B. Cases Precluding Examination of a Foreign Sovereign's
Motivations
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. 83 was one
of the first lower court cases to invoke the teachings of American
Banana. In Buttes, the plaintiff corporation sued the defendant
under various antitrust laws for conspiring with several Persian
Gulf sheikdoms to deny it oil concession profits. The complaint
alleged that the defendants conspired to restrain trade and create
and maintain a monopoly over the oil resources in the territorial
waters of the Trucial States. 84 The plaintiff maintained that it was
not challenging the validity or legality of the foreign sovereign's
actions. Instead, the plaintiff wanted to inquire into the sheikdom's
actions only to the extent necessary to determine the role of the
defendant's conduct in causing those actions. In other words, the
plaintiff's theory of conspiracy demanded an inquiry into the for-
eign government's motivations.
The district court began its discussion of the act of state issue
by citing Justice Holmes' dictum from American Banana. Although
recognizing the error in his jurisdictional holding, the court stated
that the remainder of the opinion was controlling and that the act
of state doctrine precluded examination of foreign actions induced
or procured by an antitrust defendant. 85
After this unambiguous statement, the district court's opinion
becomes less clear. The court seemingly rejected the plaintiff's'
claim that it was not challenging the validity of the foreign sover-
eign's actions. Noting that two portions of the complaint suggested
that the plaintiff was challenging the sheikdoms' conduct, the court
held that the act of state doctrine clearly precluded such an in-
quiry.86
The court did not end its analysis, which up to this point rested
on firm ground. 87 It continued by establishing another perceived
2 See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 607 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 (1965)).
83 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972).
64 See id. at 95.
See id. at 110.
See id. at 113.
17 If the court had ended its analysis here it would have been but another typical act
of state opinion based on challenged validity of a sovereign's actions.
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evil that violated act of state principles. Since the allegations re-
quired that the plaintiff prove that a foreign government issued a
fraudulent territorial water decree and that another sovereign seized
an island at the urging of the defendant, the court would be called
on to inquire into the motivations behind those actions. This
inquiry, the court concluded, would create the very diplomatic
friction and international complications that the act of state doc-
trine was meant to prevent.8 Inquiry into a sovereign's motiva-
tions, without more, could preclude domestic adjudication of a
matter if the purposes and principles underlying the act of state
doctrine would be implicated. Thus, even without the previously
necessary factual predicate of challenging the legality or validity of
a foreign government's actions, the principles behind the act of
state theory were so strong that they became a doctrine unto
themselves. For the first time, the tail began to wag the dog.
Buttes Gas was followed six years later by Hunt v. Mobile Oil
Corp.,89 one of the most criticized, 9° but often cited, act of state
opinions. Hunt, the plaintiff, alleged that seven major oil compa-
nies conspired to exclude it from the oil market in violation of
United States antitrust laws. In reliance on representations made
by the seven oil companies, Hunt refused to negotiate with the
Libyan government concerning its oil concessions. After Hunt's
refusal to negotiate, Libya refused Hunt the right to export oil and
eventually nationalized Hunt's holdings. 91 The plaintiff's theory
was that the seven oil companies had made an agreement with
Hunt that prevented it from negotiating with Libya so that the
seven could maintain the competitive advantage Persian Gulf crude
oil had over Libyan oil. Hunt maintained that the alleged agree-
ment caused the Libyan government to act aggressively toward it,
eventually resulting in the asset seizure. As in Buttes Gas, the
plaintiff did not sue the foreign sovereign and, similarly, the gov-
ernment's motivations, not the legality of its actions, were at issue
in the case.92
11 Buttes Gas, 331 F. Supp. at 110.
550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
90 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 347 (criticizing Hunt's broad application of the act
of state doctrine because it runs the risk of closing domestic courts to most international
transaction litigation); Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction an d the Acts of Foreign Sovereigns,
77 COLuM. L. Rav. 1247, 1260 (1977) (criticizing Hunt because it encourages wrongdoers
to involve a foreign country in violations of the antitrust laws in order to guarantee
application of the act of state doctrine).
91 Hunt, 550 F.2d at 71-72.
Id. at 76 ("Here it is urged that Hunt makes no claim that Libya acted illegally at
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The district and circuit courts both held that the act of state
doctrine precluded an examination of the reasons why the Libyan
government nationalized Hunt's holdings, even though the validity
of those actions was not challenged. After rejecting the plaintiff's
claim that expropriation was merely a nonpublic commercial act
under Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba,93 the court
of appeals noted that Libya had acted with a political motive. The
expropriation was undertaken as a reprisal against the United States
and the coercive practices of multinational corporations. 94 The
court concluded that any further inquiry was impermissible because
it would require the court to sit in judgment of Libya's actions.
This, the court reasoned, would violate the principles of the act of
state doctrine, in general, and Justice Holmes' dictum in American
Banana, in particular. 95
The plaintiffs countered by arguing that the Libyan govern-
ment's actions would not be challenged because Libya itself was
actually a victim of the defendant's conspiracy. The court held
that the characterization of Libya as a victim was not sufficient to
distinguish the case from American Banana and Buttes. This hold-
ing rested on two grounds. First, to prove causation for its antitrust
claim, the plaintiff would still have to inquire into the motivations
behind Libya's actions. Second, the court stated that any inquiry
into motivation would necessarily involve examination of the valid-
ity of Libya's actions, even though the plaintiff did not allege that
Libya had violated international or United States law. Any exam-
ination of Libya's actions, the court reasoned, would violate the
purposes and policies underlying the act of state doctrine. 96 The
court further reasoned that whether the legality of the foreign
sovereign's actions, or merely its motivations, were involved, the
case ran the risk of harming United States foreign policy and
embarrassing the executive branch.
The next major case outside the Second Circuit to adopt the
Hunt rationale was Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petro-
all, simply that as a matter of fact its 'lawful' act was induced-by the -uhla%'ful conduct of
the named defendants. While we agree that these points ... distinguish [Buttes Gas] ...
the distinctions ... are of no substance . . ").
9' 425 U.S. 682 (1976); see also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
9' See Hunt, 550 F.2d at 73; A. Rovn;E, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 335 (1973).
9' Hunt, 550 F.2d at 73, 74.
91 Id. at 77 ("Another inquiry could only be fissiparous, hindering or embarrassing
the conduct of foreign relations which is the very reason underlying the policy of judicial
abstention . ... ).
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leum Corp.97 The plaintiffs in Clayco alleged that the defendants
had violated the antitrust laws by bribing a foreign government
official to procure a valuable oil concession. 98 To prove the cau-
sation element of their claim, the plaintiffs had to prove that the
bribes induced the foreign government to award the defendant the
oil concession.
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
on act of state grounds because evaluation of the claim would have
required an examination of the "ethical validity" of the sovereign's
actions 99
After establishing that the awarding of an oil concession was
a public and sovereign act, the Ninth Circuit, with Judge, now
Justice, Anthony Kennedy sitting on the panel,100 upheld the district
court's dismissal. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
act of state doctrine does not preclude judicial inquiry into the
motivations behind a foreign sovereign's actions. In doing so, the
court stated that it did not reject the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mitsui & Co.,'01 be-
cause in Clayco, "the very existence of plaintiff's claim depend[ed]
upon establishing that the motivation for the sovereign act was
bribery, thus embarrassment would result from adjudication."' 02
The court went on to hold that any such inquiry would "impugn
or question the nobility of a foreign nation's motivation."''03 Thus,
the plaintiffs could not argue that the sovereign's motivations were
not protected, even when the foreign government was not a named
defendant. As long as the purposes behind the doctrine might have
97 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
91 Id. at 405.
" Id. at 406 (emphasis added). Although the court initially couched the issue in terms
of "ethical validity," there is little doubt that nothing but an inquiry into the foreign state's
motivations was required. The court later stated: "We recently reaffirmed our unwillingness
to resolve issues requiring 'inquiries . . . into the . . . motivation of the acts of foreign
sovereigns.' Appellants thus cannnot argue that inquiry into motivation in this case is
unprotected." Id. at 408 (citations omitted).
0 Justice Kennedy must have changed his mind regarding the scope of the act of state
doctrine. He joined the opinions in both Hunt and Kirkpatrick, two cases reaching opposite
results.
--1 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979); see infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
102 Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407. The court almost certainly misconstrued Mitsui because
that case explicitly stated that the act of state doctrine did not equally protect motivation
and validity, a conclusion that is inconsistent with Clayco. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp.
v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 58, 55 (5th Cir. 1979).
10 Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407 (quoting Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 607).
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arisen, the court did not care that the factual predicate of chal-
lenging validity or legality was not present.
The plaintiffs next argued that the case was justiciable under
two exceptions to the act of state doctrine. The court countered
by first rejecting the notion that the granting of an oil concession
was merely a commercial act.' °4 Next, the court held that the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act'05 did not create a new exception to
the act of state doctrine. Again, the court's analysis focused on
whether separation of powers would be harmed by such excep-
tions.t 6 Once again, the tail wagged the dog.
After examining a number of act of state cases, one could
easily conclude that the effect of the Buttes Gas-Hunt-Clayco line
of cases is more pronounced than it actually is. This is because a
number of other opinions cite language from these cases in dicta.
In some cases, where the validity of the foreign sovereign's actions
is clearly in issue, courts have carelessly quoted passages from
Buttes Gas and its progeny stating that the doctrine requires judicial
abstention not only with regard to the legality of the actions but
also the motivations behind the actions. 0 7
C. Cases Allowing Examination of a Foreign Sovereign's
Motivations
Cases in the Third and Fifth circuits have explicitly rejected
the Buttes Gas-Hunt-Clayco line, and several opinions from the
Ninth Circuit seem to modify the earlier broad interpretations of
the act of state doctrine. The Fifth Circuit, in Mitsui, was the first
to challenge Hunt's expansive reading of the act of state doctrine.
The plaintiff sued the defendant corporations for antitrust viola-
tions stemming from an alleged conspiracy between the defendants
and members of the Indonesian government. According to the
plaintiff's allegations, the Indonesian Department of Forestry re-
fused to grant the plaintiffs a timber license due to the defendant's
improper conduct. °0
"o See id. at 408.
lOS 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I to -2 (1982); see infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
,0, See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 408-09 (citations omitted) ("There is no question ... that
any prosecution under the act entails risks to our relations with the foreign governments
involved.").
101 See O.N.E. Shipping v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, 830 F.2d 449, 453 (2d
Cir. 1987); Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985).
WI See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1979).
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The district court followed the Hunt rationale and held that
there was a per se prohibition against judicial inquiry into the
motivations of a foreign sovereign's actions, no matter how un-
scrupulous they might have been. 0 9 The court of appeals reversed
this holding. It first embarked on an effort to distinguish adverse
precedent. American Banana and Buttes Gas were distinguished
from facts at hand because the former cases dealt with the right
to ownership while the latter case did not."0 The court further
distinguished Buttes Gas on the ground that the sovereign in Buttes
Gas was more intimately involved in sovereign activities than was
the Indonesian government."' The court then faced the problem
of Hunt's apparent blanket preclusion of inquiry into motivation.
Realizing that there was no principled way to distinguish Hunt,
the court chose to disagree explicitly with its rationale. The court
held, "[m]otivation and validity are [not] equally protected by the
act of state rubric.""11 2 This result was necessary, according to the
court, to guarantee the effectiveness of United States antitrust
laws." 3 Although examination of a foreign sovereign's motivations
was a factor favoring application of the act of state doctrine, the
per se rule from Hunt was impermissibly broad, especially where
the possibility of an adverse political reaction from Indonesia was
minimal.
Three years after its initial determination of the motivation
issue, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to the Mitsui
approach. In Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo v. Entex"4 the
court of appeals upheld the district court's determination that the
act of state doctrine precluded judicial determination of the case.
It did so, however, based on different grounds than those used by
the lower court. The district court had held that the Hunt approach
applied, mandating that it refrain from hearing the merits of the
plaintiff's claim, which alleged that the defendants illegally had
conspired under Texas law to take control of the plaintiff's Mexi-
can assets. The appeals court took great pains to point out that its
"I See id. at 49-50.
110 See id. at 53-54.
1 See id.
M2 Id. at 55.
-3 See id. The court said, "Precluding all inquiry into the motivation behind or
circumstances surrounding the sovereign act would uselessly thwart legitimate American
goals where adjudication would result in no embarrassment to executive department action."
Id.
114 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1982).
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affirmance of the lower court's decision was based on the more
restrictive Mitsui approach to the doctrine."15 Additionally, the
court leveled the same criticisms against Hunt that were used in its
earlier decision." 6
In the same year that Entex was decided, the Third Circuit
joined the fray by following the Mitsui formulation. In Williams
v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.," 7 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had engaged in unfair commercial practices designed to monopolize
the engine and spare parts market for several outdated American
fighter aircraft. The district court refused to dismiss the case,
relying on a misapplication of an earlier opinion, Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,"8 which the court believed created
a new, ministerial exception to the act of state doctrine. The court
of appeals rejected the lower court's interpretation of Mannington
Mills."19 It affirmed the district court's decision, however, after
engaging in the Sabbatino balancing test of relevant factors. The
appeals court reasoned that the act of state doctrine is a flexible
theory that cannot be applied according to all-encompassing rules.
Rather, each case must be examined on its own merits according
to "the nature of the questioned conduct and the effect upon the
parties in addition to the sovereign's role.' 120
After extolling the virtues of the flexible approach espoused in
Sabbatino, the court countered the defendant's argument that the
doctrine prevented examination of a foreign sovereign's motiva-
tions. Relying principally on Mitsui, the court skirted the motiva-
tion issue. It first tried to distinguish Hunt, arguing that such
expropriation cases are traditionally barred by the act of state
doctrine. The court then employed two arguments typically present
in Mitsui-type cases: application of the act of state doctrine would
needlessly defeat the purpose of United States antitrust laws and
-' See Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo v. Entex, 686 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir.
1982).
226 See id. The court concluded, "Hunt was unduly broad .... ." Id.
"1 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
I's 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
"9 See Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1982). The
district court misinterpreted Mannington Mills's discussion of the importance of the foreign
sovereign's conduct in balancing the relevant factors. The district court believed that if the
state's conduct was ministerial, not involving a truly sovereign act, then the act of state
doctrine would not apply. What the Mannington Mills court really meant was that the less
important the foreign state's act, the more likely it would be that the act of state doctrine
would not apply. See id. at 303.
1I0 Id. at 303 (quoting Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293).
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judicial determination of the case would not harm the foreign
relations of the United States.12'
The Ninth Circuit, the very court that decided Buttes Gas and
Clayco, has not been immune from the influence of the flexible
approach, or the criticismIns vehemently leveled at Hunt. Ironically,
it was a pre-Mitsui Ninth Circuit opinion, Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, N. T. & S.A., 22 that strongly influenced other
courts to adhere to the flexible approached employed in Sabbatino.
The Ninth Circuit also adopted this flexible approach in at least
two other cases, in which the respective district courts had held
that the act of state doctrine prevented judicial analysis of foreign
sovereigns' motivations. In DeRoburt v. Gannett Co.,'2 a former
president of the nation of Nauru sued the defendants for libel
stemming from a newspaper article that accused the plaintiff of
making an illegal loan to the Marshall Islands Political States
Commission.' 24 In a now familiar pattern, the appeals court re-
versed the district court's reliance on Buttes Gas and its progeny.
Following the Timberlane approach, the court balanced the relevant
factors, placing special emphasis on the potential for damaging
United States foreign relations.'25 After concluding that some of
the plaintiff's allegations would not tread too heavily on foreign
policy concerns, the court allowed part of the action to continue. 2 6
It did note, however, that the trial judge retained the power to
reexamine the issue should the plaintiff seek to prove his case with
state documents or other such materials.' 27
The Ninth Circuit had followed similar logic in Northrop Corp.
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. ,128 a case involving an alleged breach
of contract and illegal antitrust activities arising from a teaming
agreement between the parties. As in DeRoburt and a host of other
12, See id. at 304.
12 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
3 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
12, DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701, 702 (9th Cir. 1984).
12 See id. at 703. The court described its analysis as "a balancing test with the critical
element being the potential for interference with our sovereign relations." Id. (citations
omitted).
1 See id. at 704 ("After a review of the fourth amended complaint, this court believes
the balance tips in favor of the plaintiff and against the application of the act of state
doctrine .... Although resolution of the instant controversy might to some degree encroach
on areas best left untouched ... this court believes any such intrusion would be minimal
12, See id. It should be noted that earlier parts of the complaint were dismissed under
the Hunt rationale. Thus, DeRoburt is a case employing both approaches.
12 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983).
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cases,12 9 the district court dismissed the action because it would
have required an examination of a foreign sovereign's motivations
in adopting a military procurement policy. Using Orwellian dou-
blespeak, the court of appeals began its analysis of the act of state
issue by citing Buttes Gas for the proposition that the doctrine
precludes inquiry into motivation.130 This language suggested adop-
tion of the per se formulation, but the court did not follow that
path. Rather, it went on to adopt the flexible balancing test, under
which an examination of another government's motivations is merely
a factor in determining the act of state issue. The court's holding
rested on dual principles. First, the court did not want alleged
violations of law to be shielded from inquiry by the potentially
broad scope of the act of state doctrine. 3 1 Second, the court
determined that the analysis required by the case would not create
foreign policy tensions.132
D. Conclusions Regarding the Propriety of Examining a Foreign
Sovereign's Motivations
The foregoing analysis indicates that the conflicting precedents
regarding the motivation issue surprisingly rest on similar ration-
ales. The common denominator that runs through all the motiva-
tion cases is a recognition that courts should decide act of state
issues based on whether a judicial determination of the case will
harm the foreign policy of the United States or embarrass the
executive branch in the conduct of its constitutionally mandated
duties. As noted earlier, separation of powers is the axis around
which these issues revolve. The difference between the Buttes-Hunt-
Clayco line of cases and the Mitsui approach is that the former
views an examination of a foreign government's motivations as
creating a per se violation of separation of powers principles, while
the latter recognizes that such an inquiry does not always give rise
to significant foreign policy concerns. Thus, the Mitsui approach
favors flexible, case by case determinations.
'19 It cannot be emphasized enough that there is a recurring pattern of district court
dismissals with subsequent reversals on act of state grounds. This fact makes Kirkpatrick's
clarity even more appreciable.
Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1047 (9th Cir. 1983).
See id. at 1048.
132 See id.
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III. Kirkpatrick and Its Aftermath
A. The Case
In many ways, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tec-
tonics Corp., International,33 is a microcosm of the previous mo-
tivation cases. Both in terms of law and fact, it contained most of
the elements previously discussed in reference to other cases, 34 and
for that reason offered an ideal opportunity for the Supreme Court
to refine the law on this matter.
The plaintiff, Environmental Tectonics Corp., International,
sued the defendant, W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., for violations of
antitrust 35 laws and RICO. Environmental Tectonics alleged that
the defendant bribed Nigerian officials in order to win a contract
to build an aeromedical facility at a Nigerian air force base. Prior
to the civil action, the Justice Department had prosecuted Kirk-
patrick and its chief executive officer, Carpenter, for violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 3 6 Both defendants had pled
guilty to those charges. At the plea colloquy in the criminal case,
the United States attorney indicated that both the State Department
and the Nigerian government were very concerned about political
fallout from identification of officials receiving bribes.' 37 The State
.33 _ U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick III].
,34 The common factors that Kirkpatrick shared with other cases include the following:
claims based on several major domestic legislative programs (RICO, FCPA and antitrust
laws), two private United States litigants, allegations of bribery, invocation of several
doctrinal exceptions, reliance on Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. and
its progeny by the trial court, State Department involvement in determining whether to
apply the doctrine, and a heavy emphasis on separation of powers concerns.
" The plaintiffs relied on the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), (b) (1988).
136 Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 659 F. Supp.
1381, 1386-87 (D.N.J. 1987) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick 1], rev'd, 847 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1988),
aff'd, - U.S. __, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
"I See id. at 1387. The United States attorney stated:
Your Honor, I guess I would also like to say that the political impact of this
case cannot be underestimated .... I can say that the government of Nigeria
as well as the State Department [of the United States] have shown a vital
interest in the case. In fact, the State Department has been very concerned
about the possible political impact upon the government of Nigeria if the
Grand Jury disclosed certain information about who possibly received the
payments which are set forth in the memorandum that Mr. Carpenter wrote
to other senior officers of the corporation.
This is not a case where there is not a victim.
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Department dispatched a'Bernstein letter that sent somewhat con-
flicting signals to the district court judge. At the outset, the State
Department opined that the act of state doctrine did not apply to
the case. Later, however,/the letter stated:
Apart from the act of state question, however, inquiries into the
motivation and validity of foreign states' actions and discovery
against foreign government officials may seriously affect United
States foreign relations. These concerns, in the context of litiga-
tion, counsel that caution and due regard for foreign sovereign
sensibilities be exercised at each relevant stage in the proceedings.
Moreover, the court should endeavor to assure that no unneces-
sary inquiries are made, or allegations tested, during the course
of discovery or trial.'38
The Nigerian government's opinion was also requested but the
court did not receive any response. 39
The district court's decision to dismiss the case on act of state
grounds rested heavily on Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes
Gas & Oil Co., ' 40 Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,141 and Clayco Petro-
leum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 42 The opinion pro-
ceeded from the broad proposition that inquiry into motivation is
foreclosed by the act of state doctrine because it would violate
separation of powers principles. Although the court flexibly read
Hunt and Clayco as not requiring per se dismissal, its decision to
dismiss confirms this Note's characterization of them as per se
cases.' 43 In an effort to explore the matter thoroughly, the court
entered into a balancing test, using Buttes Gas, Hunt, and Clayco
as illustrative cases. The court concluded that the necessary depth
of inquiry into the Nigerian motivations for awarding the contract
to Kirkpatrick was at least as intrusive as the examination would
have been in Hunt.'44 Such an inquiry was forbidden. Moreover,
,' Id. (emphasis added).
" See id. at 1388.
461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'g 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 950 (1972).
"- 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
12 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
"I, This Note describes Hunt as creating a per se rule against inquiring into a foreign
government's motivations. There, the court held that it is impossible to separate a motivation
inquiry from a validity inquiry. See Hunt, 550 F.2d at 77. Moreover, several district courts
have read Hunt as creating what amounts to a per se rule. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp.
v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1979) (discussing district court holding).
" See Kirkpatrick I, 659 F. Supp. at 1395.
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the court found that Clayco was persuasive because any analysis
of bribery of foreign government officials would harm United
States foreign policy.' 45 This position was bolstered by citation to
the State Department letter, which, although indicating that the
act of state doctrine should not apply, suggested that examination
of a foreign sovereign's motives might cause foreign relations ten-
sions. As a parting concern, the court also rejected the State
Department suggestion that it conduct the case with an eye toward
avoiding sensitive foreign policy issues.' 46 This, the court con-
cluded, would be not only impractical, but unconstitutional.' 4
When faced with these myriad foreign relations and separation of
powers concerns, the court invoked the act of state doctrine to
dismiss.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's dis-
missal.' 41 The appeals court rejected the lower court's reliance on
Clayco and Hunt as being at odds with traditional hesitance to
invoke the act of state doctrine. 149 The court also suggested that
Hunt's analysis was not at all "flexible" because it precluded
examination of a foreign sovereign's motivations. 5 0
After rejecting Hunt and Clayco, the court determined that its
earlier decision, Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. ,'15 suggested the
proper outcome. Thus, unless the defendant could prove that the
case presented a demonstrable, concrete, and nonspeculative threat
to foreign relations, the act of state doctrine would not apply. 52
Relying in part on the specific language at the beginning of the
Bernstein letter, the court determined that no such threat existed.'53
The Supreme Court, in a remarkably short and unfootnoted
opinion, upheld the Third Circuit's decision to allow the case to
continue. 54 The Court first noted that it was not necessary to
141 See id. at 1396.
146 See id. at 1397-98.
14 See id. at 1397 n.17.
141 Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d 1052
(3d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Kirkpatrick I1], aff'd, - U.S. __, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
141 See id. at 1060 (citation omitted) ("Clayco's expansive application of the act of
state doctrine seems at variance with the principle which has guided this court, that the
doctrine 'is not lightly to be imposed .... '").
I" See id.
51 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982).
112 See Kirkpatrick II, 847 F.2d at 1061.
"I2 See id. at 1062. The court also relied on the trial judge's ability to manage discovery
properly in the case. It noted that foreign government's often are offended by expansive
discovery under the federal rules. See id. at n.11.
'" Justice Scalia wrote the unanimous opinion of the court. See Kirkpatrick III, -
U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 701.
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determine whether the Bernstein or commercial exceptions defeated
application of the act of state doctrine. 155 Rather than exploring
these alleged exceptions, the court's holding rested on the defen-
dant's failure to prove the-necessary factual predicate for applica-
tion of the doctrine. 5 6 The factual predicate to which the Court
referred was one in which adjudication would require the judicial
branch not merely to examine a sovereign's motivations or actions
as part of the background of a case, but to decide the legal effect
or validity of a foreign government's conduct. The Court stated:
Act of state issues only arise when a court must decide-that is,
when the outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official
action by a foreign sovereign. When that question is not in the
case, neither is the act of state doctrine.... Regardless of what
the court's factual findings may suggest as to the legality of the
Nigerian contract, its legality is simply not a question to be
decided in the present suit and there is thus no occasion to apply
the rule of decision that the act of state doctrine requires. 57
In reaching the above holding, the court reexamined the mean-
ing of Justice Holmes' dictum in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co. 158-the language that created the motivation controversy
in the first place. Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous Court,
conceded that Holmes might have meant that adjudication could
not proceed if a foreign government's conduct would be impugned,
even if such examination did not challenge the validity or legality
of that conduct. 5 9 The Court disposed of American Banana's
precedential effect, however, by noting that Holmes' statement was
unnecessary to the decision in the case and that whatever the value
the case might have had, later developments in antitrust law over-
came its importance.:' ° Moreover, Justice Scalia bluntly stated that
American Banana was "not an act of state case.' 16 1
Next, the Court directly examined the distinction between cases
that require an analysis of motivation and those involving the
validity of sovereign conduct. The United States, as amicus curiae,
"5 See id. - U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 704.
16 See id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 704.
'- Id. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 705.
-$- 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
01 Kirkpatrick III, - U.S. -, at , 110 S. Ct. at 705.
160 See id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 705 (noting that American Bananna's denial of
extraterritorial application to antitrust laws had been "substantially overruled").
"I Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 706.
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urged the Court to decide the case on the narrowest possible
grounds because in the future there might be a case in which an
examination of motivation alone would sufficiently "touch on
'national nerves' to warrant preclusion of a suit. 62 Although
noting that the United States' suggestions were deceptively analo-
gous to arguments made in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 163 the Court rejected this approach. 64 It reiterated the need
for the proper factual predicate as a prerequisite to any balancing
test: only after a defendant proves that litigation would challenge
the validity of a foreign government's conduct might any balancing
test be appropriate. The doctrine was the law, and the purposes of
avoiding foreign relations tensions and preventing executive branch
embarrassment were secondary and subordinate. 16 The underlying
policies of the act of state doctrine simply were not a doctrine in
their own right. 66 The tail could no longer wag the dog.
B. Jurisprudential Impact
The most immediate consequence of the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Kirkpatrick is the limiting of the act of state doctrine in
some important respects. An entire class of cases-those dealing
solely with the motivations, but not the validity, of foreign sover-
eign actions-has been eliminated from act of state jurisprudence.
Buttes Gas, Hunt, Clayco and their progeny are overruled insofar
as they hold that the act of state doctrine precludes judicial inquiry
into a foreign sovereign's motivations. Numerous other cases are
undermined with respect to dicta suggesting that in certain cases
"6 Id., 110 S. Ct. at 706. Further, "We should not, the United States urges, 'attach
dispositive significance to the fact that this suit involves only the motivation for rather than
the validity of, a foreign sovereign act."' Id., 110 S. Ct. at 706.
163 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
164 See Kirkpatrick III, U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 706-07 ("We suggested that a sort
of balancing approach could be applied-the balance shifting against application of the
doctrine, for example, if the government that committed the 'challenged act of state' is no
longer in existence .... But what is appropriate in order to avoid unquestioning judicial
acceptance of the acts of foreign sovereigns is not similarly appropriate for the quite opposite
purpose of expanding judicial incapacities where such acts are not directly (or even indirectly)
involved. It is one thing to suggest, as we have, that the policies underlying the act of state
doctrine should be considered in deciding whether, despite the doctrine's technical availa-
bility, it should nonetheless not be invoked; it is something quite different to suggest that
those underlying policies are a doctrine unto themselves, justifying expansion of the doctrine
... into uncharted fields.").
163 See id. at . 110 S. Ct. at 706.
- See id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 707.
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having the potential for harm to United States foreign policy the
act of state doctrine prohibits a motivation analysis. Moreover,
dozens of cases citing Hunt's broad reformulation of the doctrine
are now worthless with regard to those statements.
In addition to having a significant impact on the precedential
value of lower court opinions, Kirkpatrick makes it difficult to
find any part of American Banana that remains intact. In the areas
of act of state and antitrust jurisprudence, American Banana stood
for two propositions. First, it held that the antitrust laws had no
extraterritorial effect. 67 This conclusion was implicitly overruled
by later cases, such as Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp.168 Second, Justice Holmes' dictum regarding a do-
mestic court's inability to hear challenges to foreign seizures was
often cited as an act of state principle forbidding judicial analysis
of a foreign government's motivation. 169 This dictum did not sur-
vive Kirkpatrick.
An example of how the act of state doctrine has been amelio-
rated, and how future cases will be decided, is the recent decision,
Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc. 170 In Lamb, apparently the only circuit
court decision to decide a claim based on foreign sovereign moti-
vations since Kirkpatrick,'7' domestic tobacco growers sued Phillip
Morris, Inc. for antitrust and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act viol-
ations. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant made illegal con-
tributions to a Venezuelan charity, managed by the Venezuelan
president's wife, in exchange for price controls on Venezuelan
tobacco. The court began its analysis by determining whether or
not the defendant had established the necessary "factual predicate"
for application of the doctrine. 72 The defendants failed to prove
that the plaintiff's claims would require an examination of the
validity of any Venezuelan act. The best the defendants could do
was to maintain that the case would necessitate an improper anal-
ysis of a foreign government's motivations under Hunt and
'67 See American Banana, 213 U.S. at 359.
,1- 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962).
'61 Buttes Gas, 331 F. Supp. at 111-114.
17 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 961 (1991).
272 Although Lamb is the only circuit court opinion to evaluate the meaning of
Kirkpatrick, several district courts have examined the matter briefly. See Phoenix Canada
Oil Co. v. Texaco Ltd., 749 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Galu v. Swiss Air: Swiss Air
Transport Co., 734 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
,7 Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1026 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
U.S. - , 111 S. Ct. 961 (1991).
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Clayco.' 73 Citing Kirkpatrick, the circuit court reversed the district
court's dismissal, thus allowing the antitrust claims to proceed.
Lamb demonstrates how Kirkpatrick has simplified analysis of
act of state cases-at least those dealing with motivation. No longer
will courts initially have to discuss the balancing test and policy
considerations that were prevalent under pre-Kirkpatrick cases. Nor
will courts first have to wade through the half dozen or so alleged
exceptions to the act of state doctrine. Additionally, the compli-
cated issue of whether or not alleged conduct is sovereign in nature
will not be necessary as a preliminary matter. Rather, a single
factual finding is all that will be necessary to determine the tech-
nical availability of the doctrine. Granted, should a court find that
the validity of a foreign government's action is challenged, it will
have to analyze the previously mentioned issues. Dozens of cases,
however, now can be summarily decided or even avoided because
courts and defendants know that, in light of Kirkpatrick, parties
must carry a heavy burden before they can invoke the act of state
doctrine.
C. Impact on Act of State Problems
1. Separation of Powers
Over the years, one of the principal criticisms of the act of
state doctrine and its expansion has rested on separation of powers
concerns.174 This should not be surprising, even though the modern
justification for the doctrine is separation of powers. In many ways
the division of power among the branches of government is a zero-
sum game. Whenever power is given to one branch of government,
it is taken from another, unless, of course, it comes from the
people.
In the modern act of state context, the judiciary originally
relinquished power to the executive branch so that the President's
ability to conduct foreign affairs would not be hindered. 75 The
judiciary's surrender of power, in the Supreme Court cases, is
somewhat understandable because in those cases adjudication may
well have inhibited executive branch efficiency. All but one of the
"7 Id. at 1026-27.
174 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 375-76.
17, See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432.
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cases dealt with expropriation,1 76 a subject about which there is
little international agreement and a great deal of strife. Addition-
ally, in only one modern case has the Supreme Court determined
that the act of state doctrine applied to the merits. 77 Moreover, a
majority of the court has never accepted an executive branch
Bernstein letter as being dispositive regarding the doctrine's appli-
cation in a case. 178 Thus, Supreme Court interpretation of the
doctrine has not been overly deferential to the executive branch.
When the executive has been silent, the court has exercised the
doctrine with prudence.
The approach taken by Buttes Gas, Hunt, Clayco and their
progeny is not appropriate, however. These courts gave up tremen-
dous amounts of power in a variety of factual scenarios, many of
which had nothing to do with foreign government takings. They
not only deferred to executive branch wishes, but they also gave
up power where the executive branch was silent, refusing to hear
cases based on their own findings that foreign relations would
somehow be harmed if the suits continued. Although this approach
is theoretically sound in validity cases, where it is better that courts
make their own determinations instead of relying on State Depart-
ment pronouncements, it should never have been used in motiva-
tion cases. It is one thing for courts to refuse to sit in judgment
of the legality of a sovereign's actions, but it is quite another to
refuse to examine a foreign state's motivations. In the former case,
the possibility of international offense is great because, in adjudi-
cating, United States courts possibly would not give legal effect to
a foreign sovereign's conduct and laws. In the latter case, however,
there is little chance for diplomatic harm since the legal effect of
a government's actions will be honored absolutely in the United
States, even by the judicial branch. 179 The only possible source of
embarrassment or diplomatic tension, in the latter case, thus stems
from the disclosure of improper motivations of foreign government
officials. Surely a few lines in a published judicial opinion, em-
barrassing though they may be, are not sufficient to outweigh the
176 The only Supreme Court case not dealing with a foreign confiscation was Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
'" See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398.
See Comment, Rationalizing the Federal Act of State Doctrine, supra note 54, at
299-300.
79 See Kirkpatrick III, U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 705 (requiring that courts deem
foreign governments' actions valid).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
judiciary's duty to decide cases and controversies' 80 properly pre-
sented."" The act of state doctrine is, after all, designed to protect
the conduct and laws of other nations, not the people that govern
those nations.
Careless judicial self-restraint, through refusal to decide cases
involving a foreign government's motivations, threatens the judi-
ciary's role in the American tripartite system of government. Justice
White, in his dissent in Sabbatino, reflected this argument when
he stated, "[O]ur courts are obliged to determine controversies on
their merits, in accordance with the applicable law.' 1 82
The most dangerous situation occurs when the act of state
doctrine is invoked in motivation cases as a result of cajoling by
the executive branch. As one commentator has stated: "The sep-
aration of powers doctrine contemplates that courts will decide
cases independently and without direction or influence from the
executive or legislative branches. The bulwark of democracy is an
independent judiciary."' 83 The use of Bernstein letters, in general,
damages this judicial independence, 84 but in the context of moti-
vation cases it is more egregious because, as discussed previously,
it is difficult to imagine any fact pattern dealing with motivation
alone that would warrant subordination of the judiciary's article
III duties. A refusal to determine the merits of a matter, without
proper justification, threatens the legitimacy of the courts and
destroys the judiciary's image as an independent, neutral, and
apolitical body. 185 These very concerns led Congress to adopt a
restrictive view of sovereign immunity in the Foreign Sovereign
80 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
18, This is especially true considering that many published opinions applying the act of
state doctrine to motivation cases detail the allegations of the complaint and the preliminary
evidence. It is ironic that courts such as Hunt, under their own analysis, risked harming
diplomatic relations by examining whether or not to hear the case.
Courts may be concerned about another source of embarrassment, wide-ranging dis-
covery. This can be managed easily by controlling the scope of discovery. Only narrow
requests would be relevant to most cases, since a plaintiff usually need show only that an
act occurred resulting in injury.
182 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 450-51 (White, J., dissenting).
83 Bazyler, supra note 19, at 375.
114 See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790 (1972)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that adherence to executive branch advice on act of state
issues "politicizes the judiciary").
"I5 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 375. See generally Comment, Legitimacy: The
Sacrificial Lamb at the Altar of Executive Privilege, 78 Ky. L.J. 817 (1989-90) (discussing
the importance of the Supreme Court's continued legitimacy).
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Immunity Act. 186 Through this Act, Congress sought to release the
courts from executive branch influence. 187
Lower courts, too, have worried about the act of state doc-
trine's effects on judicial independence and competency. In O.N.E.
Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A. ,18 the
court stated that the applicability of the act of state doctrine "is
a legitimate exercise of an Article III court, not to be controlled
by the expressed view of the executive branch in a given case."' 89
In the Kirkpatrick litigation, the district court discussed several
concerns raised by the State Department's warnings regarding how
to try the case.' 9° In analyzing the State Department's suggestion
that the court tread lightly in certain areas that might have given
rise to foreign policy problems, the court stated that it was not
competent to evaluate the foreign policy impact of trial decisions.'19
Although the court mainly feared that executive branch functions
would suffer, it also seemed bothered by the image such policy
determinations would create. The opinion hypothesized a foreign
policy advisor to the court, which surely would create an appear-
ance of impropriety, not to mention other concomitant separation
of powers concerns. 92 It must be conceded, however, that the
district court's resolution of these separation of powers issues was
to refuse to hear the case, a conclusion that goes against the
Supreme Court's later holding and analysis. Nevertheless, the court's
arguments do suggest that the judiciary is harmed when the exec-
utive involves itself in act of state determinations.
The constitutional functions of Congress are also damaged
when the judicial branch abstains from hearing the merits of mo-
tivation cases, 93 whether or not such a decision is taken at the
behest of the executive branch. When courts refuse to determine
the merits of a motivation case, they also refuse to enforce public
policy as manifested by the enactment of laws. Although the same
is true of validity cases, judicial abstention in motivation cases is
11 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 375-76.
See id.
830 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1987).
O.N.E. Shipping v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana, 830 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir.
1987) (citation omitted).
190 See Kirkpatrick I, 649 F. Supp. at 1397.
"I See id. at n.17.
192 Id.
193 See Mitsui, 594 F.2d at 55 (stating that application of the act of state doctrine
would thwart Congressional antitrust laws).
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inexcusable because there is no countervailing justification to out-
weigh the court's refusal to follow public policy. As demonstrated
previously, there is no legitimate concern because executive branch
functions cannot be damaged by following domestic laws in moti-
vation cases. The result has been that major legislative programs,
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, RICO and myriad
federal antitrust laws, are not enforced when defendants prove that
a foreign government's motivations lurk somewhere in the back-
ground of the case.194 These problems are discussed at length later
in this Note, but for present purposes it is sufficient to say that
the functions of all branches of government are threatened by
application of the act of state doctrine to motivation cases.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kirkpatrick resolves many of
the previously discussed problems by creating a per se rule stating
that pure motivation cases must be heard, even when the executive
branch objects. The Court rejected the government's position that
in the future there may be some motivation cases that would
sufficiently threaten the executive branch's power to warrant ap-
plication of the doctrine. The Court answered the government's
argument-that the motivation/validity distinction should not be
dispositive-by reaffirming that under no circumstances will the
policies behind the doctrine be sufficient to bar adjudication unless
the validity of a foreign sovereign's conduct is challenged. Only
after the court determines that the factual predicate is met will
executive branch opinions and suggestions be considered as part of
the Sabbatino balancing test. Similarly, a court itself will not
independently examine a case's potential impact on foreign policy
and separation of powers until the defendant proves that more
than just motivations are involved. If validity is not questioned,
the act of state doctrine does not apply.
Kirkpatrick's restriction of the act of state doctrine should
protect the separation of powers doctrine better than the Hunt line
of cases. The executive branch's power will not be harmed because
judicial inquiry into a foreign government's motivation will not
offend the foreign state or embarrass the executive branch in its
conduct of foreign affairs. The legislative branch's power will be
preserved because courts will enforce domestic laws and public
-policy, in the absence of a countervailing need to protect executive
power, which will exist in validity cases only. The judiciary's power
"1 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 376-81; Note, supra note 23, at 413; Note, supra
note 90, at 1260-61.
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will similarly be guarded because courts will fulfill their constitu-
tional duty to decide cases and controversies. Additionally, the
judiciary's decision on act of state issue will be influenced by the
executive branch in only those cases where there is truly a threat
to the functions of a coordinate branch of government.
2. International Business Transactions and Individual Litigants
Critics of the act of state doctrine often point out that appli-
cation of the doctrine leads to uncertainty in international business
transactions195 and hardships for individual litigants.' 96 Several con-
cerns are present with regard to planning international transactions.
Typically, when entering into an agreement, private parties seek to
allocate risks according to prevailing legal standards and possible
adverse occurrences. For example, where one of the parties is a
foreign country, the other parties to the transaction may seek a
waiver of sovereign immunity so that recovery will be allowed in
domestic courts should the transaction fail due to actions by the
foreign state. Sophisticated international businessmen rely on state,
federal, and international law to structure deals that are beneficial
to all parties concerned. Moreover, liability risks are bargained for
so that their costs are ultimately included in the economics of the
deal.
Careful planning and reliance by international dealers can be
frustrated, however, by application of the act of state doctrine.
The conduct of parties to the transaction, as well as independent
third parties, may be illegal, giving rise to claims in domestic
courts. However, the potential plaintiffs may find that their forum
for legal remedy, the courts, is not available because of the act of
state doctrine.
The potential scope of the doctrine under the Hunt line of
cases is expansive, because the motivations of foreign states' actions
are potentially involved in many transactions. 97 This is especially
true in the Third World where many industrial development pro-
jects involve at least some governmental action, even if it is only
the granting of a concession, license or permit. 98 In some cases,
government involvement may be more direct and substantial, as in
"I See Note, supra note 73, at 131-32 (arguing that more United States involvement
in international law will stabilize law despite what critics say).
"I See id. at 118-19.
191 See Note, supra note 90, at 1260.
I' See, e.g., Mitsui, 594 F.2d at 48.
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military procurement cases. 99 No matter how important the gov-
ernment action, the doctrine threatens to prevent aggrieved parties
from obtaining redress, even when the foreign government is not
a defendant and the suit is between two American litigants. More-
over, under the Hunt analysis, the validity of governmental actions
is not a prerequisite to the doctrine's applicability.
When a court invokes the act of state doctrine to dismiss a
claim, the careful planning involved in international transactions
may unravel. Consequently, the distribution of risks among the
parties is unsettled, because application of the doctrine sometimes
cannot be foreseen in motivation cases. Even if a foreign govern-
ment's involvement in a transaction is anticipated, the importance
of its motivations rarely can be. Thus, any reliance on state,
federal, or international law is misplaced and unadvised. Moreover,
if the foreign sovereign itself is named as defendant, then any
waiver of sovereign immunity is worthless, because the act of state
doctrine serves as a second source of defense.200 Such uncertainty
and instability ultimately result in greater transaction costs for
businessmen, who will seek more security in their dealings.
Application of the act of state doctrine in motivation cases not
only undermines international transactions, but it also denies in-
dividual litigants a meaningful chance to seek justice.20 ' The Hunt
line of cases, with its broad scope encompassing almost any liti-
gation where a defendant can make a colorable claim of foreign
sovereign involvement, has lead many lower courts to dismiss on
act of state grounds. Some courts have jumped at the opportunity,
provided by Hunt, to apply the act of state doctrine. 20 2 After all,
dockets are congested and act of state cases typically involve com-
plicated international law issues. 203 The Supreme Court cases, on
the other hand, do not afford lower courts with an easy way out.
Rather, they allow courts to dismiss only where the validity of a
foreign government's actions is involved.2 4
The Hunt expansion of earlier Supreme Court precedent is
difficult for a private litigant suing another private litigant in a
domestic court to understand. If the validity of the foreign state's
119 See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright, 694 F.2d at 300.
200 See Callego v. Bancomer S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Note, supra note 23,
at 415.
210 See Note, supra note 73, at 118.
- See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 328.
201 See id.
101 See Kirkpatrick II, U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 704-05.
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actions is not involved, it is hard for the plaintiff to reconcile
judicial dismissal of the case because the separation of powers
rationale is not truly implicated. Granted, the plaintiff that does
not have his day in court is always disappointed. But the act of
state doctrine, unlike the political question and sovereign immunity
doctrines, is more difficult to understand, because in the latter case
the government itself is almost always involved and the validity of
a government's actions is usually challenged, while in the former
case, foreign sovereigns are usually not defendants and, at least
under Hunt, the contested validity of their acts is not a prerequisite
to dismissal of the case.
Kirkpatrick eliminates some of the problems of the act of state
doctrine's impact on international transactions and individual liti-
gants. By significantly limiting the scope of this doctrine, Kirkpa-
trick has removed an entire class of concerns for the international
deal maker. At least in cases where validity is not involved, the
act of state doctrine no longer bars adjudication of cases. Simply
by reimposing the factual predicate that always existed under Su-
preme Court cases, Kirkpatrick has, for the most part, relegated
the act of state doctrine to foreign takings cases and a few other
factual scenarios, few of which involve circumstances that are
planned for, or take place in, garden-variety international trans-
actions. The reduction of the risk of dismissal under the act of
state doctrine could further grease the wheels of international com-
merce and create efficiencies resulting from reduced costs.
3. Enforcement of Domestic Laws
The act of state doctrine in its Buttes-Hunt-Clayco formulation
impeded the effectiveness of several major legislative programs. 20 5
In addition to raising the separation of powers concerns addressed
previously, the incapacitation of domestic laws threatens to damage
business practices and competition both at home and abroad.206
The principal legislative casualty of Hunt's expansive reading
of the doctrine is the federal antitrust laws. The antitrust laws
20, See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 376-81 (arguing that the act of state doctrine in
general harms the effectiveness of United States law); Note, supra note 23 (arguing for a
commercial exception in order to bring doctrine in line with the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act of 1976); Note, supra note 90, at 1260-61 (arguing that the act of state doctrine,
in its Hunt formulation, affects adversely the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and
antitrust laws).
See Mitsui, 594 F.2d at 55.
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apply to foreign actions that have a "direct and substantial effect"
on United States commerce.20 7 Since the time of United States v.
Sisal Sales Corp., and Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carson Corp., courts have entertained extraterritorial antitrust
claims, for the very reason that international commerce has the
potential to affect domestic commerce and competition adversely.
Enforcement of the antitrust laws is dependent on private suits,
which are encouraged through the awarding of treble damages. 208
Application of the act of state doctrine often precludes these private
enforcement actions, even where only motivations of a foreign
government are involved.
To understand how the antitrust laws were threatened by Hunt's
analysis, one need only examine the shear number of act of state
cases that are based on antitrust claims. 209 Hunt itself is such a
case.210 By allowing defendants to invoke the act of state doctrine
in motivation cases, the lower courts have encouraged violations
of the antitrust laws. Would-be violators simply had to read Hunt
to find an easy escape from antitrust liability. Anyone wishing to
avoid the Sherman Act could do so as long as a foreign government
was involved enough to warrant application of the doctrine under
Hunt's policy-based analysis .21I
The court in Industrial Investment Development Corp. v. Mit-
sui & Co. 212 realized the danger of Hunt's reasoning. It made two
points. First, the court stated, "Precluding all inquiry into the
motivation behind or circumstances surrounding the sovereign act
* . .uselessly thwart[s] legitimate American goals where adjudica-
tion would result in no embarrassment to executive department
action." 213 Second, the court argued that the act of state doctrine
should not shield private conspirators simply because they are able
to procure a foreign state as a coconspirator. 21 4
0 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d
597, 610 (9th Cir. 1976).
0 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 378-79.
See, e.g., Kirkpatrick III, U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 701; O.N.E. Shipping, 830
F.2d 449; Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir. 1983);
Clayco, 712 F.2d 404; Curtiss- Wright, 694 F.2d at 300; International Ass'n of Machinists
v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Mitsui, 594 F.2d 48; Mannington Mills Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597; Buttes Gas,
461 F.2d 1261.
210 See Hunt, 550 F.2d at 68.
21 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 379.
212 594 F.2d at 48.
213 Id. at 55.
214 See id.
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Although Kirkpatrick did not address the motivation issue by
analyzing effects on domestic laws, the court might have intended
to solve this problem. In many ways, Kirkpatrick represents a
conflict of laws approach to the act of state doctrine. 215 A basic
premise of conflict of laws is that courts should apply the laws of
the sovereign that created them if applying other law would violate
domestic public policy.216 To do otherwise would damage separa-
tion of powers. The act of state doctrine can be seen as an excep-
tion to this basic rule. 217 In other words, the act of state doctrine
precludes domestic courts from invoking domestic law even when
applying foreign law would violate United States public policy. 218
Moreover, the doctrine requires that United States courts deem
foreign government actions legal under foreign law.2 19
Kirkpatrick indicates that the proper reasons for refusing to
apply domestic law are very narrow and difficult to prove. The act
of state doctrine is only justified when the validity of a foreign
state's actions is in question. Where motivation is the sole issue,
the justifications for application of the doctrine do not outweigh
the basic conflict of laws rule that requires United States courts to
apply congressional law. Kirkpatrick indicates that public policy,
as manifested in the antitrust laws, overrides the act of state
doctrine in motivation cases because the basic conflict of laws rule
must be honored when no other interests exist. This same analysis
holds true for the application of RICO and other laws to defen-
dants in motivation cases. By rendering the Buttes Gas-Hunt-Clayco
line of cases impotent, the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick has
reinstated congressional primacy in all but a narrow class of cases.
Only when legitimate countervailing interests are concerned will
domestic laws go unenforced.
Another legislative program threatened by lower court moti-
vation cases was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.20 Passed in
1977, the Act criminalizes bribery to foreign officials for business
purposes32' The Act's existence represents a public policy deter-
215 See generally Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 CoLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 178-79 (1967); Note, supra note 73, at 106-08.
216 See Henkin, supra note 215, at 178.
217 See Note, supra note 73, at 107.
218 See id.; see also Henkin, supra note 215, at 178.
219 See Kirkpatrick I, U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 707.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I to -2 (1982).
221 See id.
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mination by two branches of government that such practices are
dangerous enough to warrant criminal sanctions. 22
In Clayco, the Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act when it invoked the act of state doctrine.
The act of state exception to the basic conflict rule was not war-
ranted because only a foreign state's motivations were involved.
Thus, there were no countervailing interests to merit not applying
the anti-bribery laws. By refusing to find a bribery exception to
the act of state doctrine in motivation cases brought under the
FCPA, the court destroyed any possibility for private enforcements
under the Act. After all, by definition, a violation of the Act
requires inquiry into the conduct of a foreign official or agency.
In addition to hindering the effectiveness of antitrust, RICO
and anti-bribery laws, application of the act of state doctrine to
motivation cases also had the potential to undermine federal se-
curities laws. 223 These laws, passed to protect investors, have been
applied extraterritorially. Although few claims arising under the
securities laws were dismissed on act of state grounds, the potential
for expansion of the Hunt rationale into another legislative pro-
gram menaced the separation of powers and conflict of laws origins
of the doctrine. By eviscerating Hunt, the Supreme Court, in
Kirkpatrick, ended another threat before it became reality.
Kirkpatrick's holding not only restored federal law to its proper
stature, but it also reinstated a plaintiff's ability to invoke state
law claims in motivation cases. Under the Buttes Gas-Hunt-Clayco
line of cases, state claims based on tort, contract, libel, and a host
of other theories were either dismissed, or ran the risk of being
dismissed, under the act of state doctrine. 224 By requiring that a
defendant prove the factual predicate, Kirkpatrick protects the
power of state legislatures, because courts may apply the doctrine
only when there are sufficient justifications to outweigh domestic
public policy. Thus, state courts and federal district courts sitting
in diversity will be required to apply state law to act of state cases
unless the validity of a foreign government's actions is questioned.
4. Development of International Law
Since the time of Sabbatino, commentators and Congress have
criticized the act of state doctrine because it removes the United
11 See Note, supra note 90, at 1261.
223 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 379.
21 See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1984); Compania
de Gas De Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, 686 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1982).
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States courts from the process of developing international law. 225
In its classic formulation, the doctrine precludes domestic courts
from inquiring into the validity of a foreign sovereign's actions.
This definition prohibits judicial scrutiny of domestic as well as
international validity or legality. In fact, all but one of the Supreme
Court cases until Kirkpatrick dealt with the international validity
of a foreign state's conduct. Some have concluded that application
of the act of state doctrine has hindered the development of inter-
national law because, like common law, it matures over time
through trial and error, custom and practice.226 Since Sabbatino,
and the more restrictive Hunt, limit a plaintiff's access to domestic
courts, the judicial branch has been afforded fewer and fewer
opportunities to delve into emerging international policy issues,
such as expropriations, bribery, and antitrust. Thus, some of the
most respected legal thinkers in the world have not been allowed
to explore those issues. In part, these concerns led Congress to act
on several occasions to abolish the act of state doctrine. 227 In a
world where the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice are not very effective,228 and infrequently used, the rule of
international law must be developed in the domestic courts of the
world. Until now, one of the major players has been missing from
the scene.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kirkpatrick serves only a
limited role in remedying the problem. It is true that more cases
involving international issues will proceed in domestic courts, but
the depth and scope of their analysis may be limited for two
reasons. First, motivation cases, the class of litigation now allowed
under all circumstances, are the disputes that most indirectly in-
volve international law. Typically, the plaintiff's claim in a.moti-
vation case rests on domestic laws, such as the Sherman Act or
the FCPA. Usually, when motivation cases involve expropriation
or other controversial international issues, they can be reclassified
22 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 381-84; Note, supra note 73, at 122-26.
22 See Bazyler, supra note 19, at 381-84; Note, supra note 73, at 124.
2" Congress' first attempt to limit the act of state doctrine was the Hickenlooper
Amendment, which sought to require United States courts to adjudicate foreign confiscation
cases. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982). It was poorly drafted and had little effect on the
act of state doctrine.
The next major attempt to destroy the doctrine came in 1981 with the Mathias Bill,
which would have required United States courts to hear cases in which the defendant had
violated international law. See S.1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
2 It is very difficult for a private party to overcome State Department inertia.
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as validity cases. Thus, they would contain the act of state factual
predicate, precluding further inquiry.
On the other hand, where a case involves solely a foreign
government's motivations, these international issues will not be
examined in detail because Kirkpatrick does not allow analysis of
validity. 229 To the contrary, in motivation cases, the act of state
doctrine requires domestic courts to deem the foreign sovereign's
actions legal.230 The issue in a motivation case is not the legality
of the conduct, but that the conduct occurred.23' The occurrence
of the event (e.g., the bribe) and the resulting foreign action are
all that is involved in most motivation cases. The legality of the
government conduct normally is not at issue.
The second limitation on Kirkpatrick's ability to reintroduce
domestic courts into the international arena, is its failure to alter
Sabbatino's balancing test appreciably in validity cases. Once the
factual predicate has been met, the courts are still free to apply
the act of state doctrine where this balancing test so warrants. The
act of state doctrine will continue to provide grounds for dismissal
in the very cases in which courts would have an opportunity to
explore, define, and implement international law.
Perhaps Kirkpatrick offers a few glimmers of hope for those
that want domestic courts to enter the international legal arena. In
motivation cases, it is possible that a few brave, but unwise, courts
will, in dicta, comment on or condemn a foreign state's actions
and their relationship to international law. This is unlikely, how-
ever, because few courts would dare to expand an opinion in this
context beyond what is necessary. It is also possible that public
discussion of foreign sovereign action in motivation cases will lead
to more of a consensus on international matters.
In validity cases, Kirkpatrick may represent a continuation of
the Court's restriction of the act of state doctrine. The Court
reemphasized, by its holding, that the doctrine is not to be lightly
invoked.232 One must remember that the last time the Supreme
Court applied the doctrine was in Sabbatino, a case decided more
than twenty-five years ago. Despite these speculations, there is
simply not enough discussion of validity cases in Kirkpatrick to
2 See Kirkpatrick III, U.S. at - , 110 S. Ct. at 707.
230 See id.
231 Id. at 705.
232 Id. at 707.
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anticipate whether courts will seize the opportunity to examine
international law.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp.2 3 makes significant contributions toward
resolving decades-old act of state problems. Particularly in the
areas of separation of powers, international business transactions,
and the enforceability of antitrust, anti-bribery, and RICO laws,
the decision retakes ground lost to earlier lower court decisions.
Kirkpatrick does not, however, resolve problems in the area of
United States judicial involvement in the development of interna-
tional law. Resolution of this issue would most likely require a
near complete abolition of the act of state doctrine, something the
court is not yet willing to do, or for that matter, may never be
willing to do. This last question is one that interests courts, scho-
lars, and litigants alike. Kirkpatrick offers little indication about
whether its restriction of the act of state doctrine stems from a
desire to reign the doctrine in so that it will be saved from legis-
lative destruction, or from a willingness to beat Congress to that
task. Whether Kirkpatrick represents a funeral pyre or a phoenix,
only time will tell.
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